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Paving a New Way to Read Gramsci
Takahiro Chino
1. Introduction
Gramsci’s Pathways by Guido Liguori, a leading Gramsci scholar,
who has edited books and published numerous important monographs, articles and chapters in books, is a pleasing addition to the
literature on Gramsci. It is a translation of his Sentieri gramsciani,
with the Preface to the English Edition and two new chapters,
Chapters Four and Fourteen, that did not appear in the original
version in Italian. In total it has fourteen chapters, half of them
being dedicated to the rigorous philological hermeneutic reading of
Gramsci. The other half is where he relates Gramsci to those who
influenced Gramsci and who are influenced by Gramsci. It provides
us not only with a landscape of Gramsci’s theoretical developments
in the Prison Notebooks, but also shows how Gramsci learnt from his
forerunners in elaborating them and how they have been appropriated by later thinkers. As such, the examinations by the prominent scholar in this book range from well-known ideas of Gramsci
such as the state, civil society, and party to the intellectual history of
Gramscian ideas such as hegemony, pragmatism, and ideology.
As this short review of such an absorbing book cannot do justice
to all aspects of it, I will limit myself and deliberately focus on some
chapters that exemplify the hermeneutic analysis of Gramsci’s Prison
Notebooks. For Liguori’s hermeneutic method contains important
suggestions for the long-discussed question of how we can read the
Prison Notebooks, which I believe the readers of Gramsci cannot
avoid asking. In my view, the key terms in Liguori’s analysis are the
“extended state” and “common sense”. While the extended state
involves many of Gramsci’s core ideas such as state, civil society,
party, movements and hegemony, common sense is closely related
to ideology, conception of the world, good sense, and conformism.
As these two key concepts seem to anchor Liguori’s thoughtful
discussions about Gramsci, I will look at Liguori’s analysis of them
respectively. In the final section, I will make a few remarks on how
to further develop Liguori’s proposed approach of going back to
Gramsci’s texts.
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Before starting the body of my review, I need to mention one
more aspect: its methodological closeness with the monumental
work Dizionario gramsciano 1926-1937 of 2009, edited by Liguori and
Pasquale Voza.1 As written in the Preface to Gramsci’s Pathways,
Liguori’s motives for editing the Dizionario seem closely connected
to those of writing Pathways. When starting seminars for the
Dizionario in 2001, according to him,
[w]e started out from the conviction that it is today possible to read
Gramsci as a great contemporary author – not a politically neutral one, but
neither one who can immediately be compressed into present-day political
debates. Hence the belief that now we need to “go back to the texts”, to “his”
texts, after years and years of interpretations that had built up a long and
sometimes fruitful – but now useless – “battle of ideas” on top of them (p. IX).

As this principle seems to straddle both the Dizionario and
Pathways, it would be helpful for us to quickly summarize the two
following important characteristics of the Dizionario in order to
grasp the shared principle. First, the Dizionario instantiates how
Gramsci defined and used his ideas throughout the Notebooks,
providing us with a landscape of how Gramsci himself employs a
contested idea, such as hegemony. This enables us to narrow down
the possible intended meanings of his ideas, while avoiding
excessively extending meanings beyond Gramsci’s writings. Second,
the Dizionario illustrates how Gramsci’s ideas are not mechanically
distinct, but organically interrelated to one another. It helps us
understand how throughout the years the web of his ideas, such as
the relationship between state and civil society, were developed in
the Notebooks.
As I will examine below, we can observe that Gramsci’s Pathways
shares these two characteristics with the Dizionario and provides a
deeper analysis of the Notebooks through Liguori’s hermeneutic
approach.
2. The Extended State
The first uniqueness I deliberately picked up from Gramsci’s Pathways is found in Chapter 2. It resides in its focus on the “extended
State” as a key phrase in understanding Gramsci’s complex, and
“organic”, relationship between the State and the economy, and
1 Liguori

and Voza 2009.
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between the State and civil society. It is well known that Gramsci
complained about the common understanding of the State as a
mere organ of violence.2 According to Liguori, Gramsci refined the
concept of the State to encompass two characteristic traits of earlytwentieth-century States.
The first “extension” of the State can be seen in the new relationship between the State and economy. This is intriguing as it is
relatively little discussed in comparison with the second extension.
States originally separated politics from economics, yet a new
relationship between the two terrains emerged in his time. As
observed in the cases of Italy, Soviet Russia, and the United States
after the crisis of 1929, the State had started to intervene in the
economy. Gramsci analyzed that the State had to assume the
important role of guaranteeing savings and organizing production,
which previously the bourgeoisie controlled according to its private
initiative, after observing the Great Crash of 1929 and the market’s
failure regarding self-regulation.3
However, Liguori quickly adds, Gramsci did not jettison the
Marxist assumption of the State as the expression of the economic
situation. Gramsci’s civil society is commonly understood as a part
of the superstructure, together with political society (the State as
violence), and a site for producing people’s consent to the existing
governance. Yet, it should be noted, as Liguori emphasizes, that –
albeit rarely – Gramsci argued that civil society and the economy
could be closely connected with the State, acting as the bond:
between economic structure and the State with its legislation and coercion
stands civil society [...]; the State is the instrument of the adequation of civil
society to the economic structure.4

As Liguori points out, however, Gramsci did not endorse, on the
one hand, Fascist corporativism due to its plutocratic character and
2 Q15§10, p. 1765; Selections from the Prison Notebooks (hereafter SPN), p. 244. Following
convention, quotations from the Quaderni del carcere (Prison Notebooks) are shown by notebook
number (Q), passage number (§) and page number. Where English translations are available
from Gramsci’s Pathways and direct quotations are required, I make use of them. Where neither,
I quote from English translations of the Prison Notebooks.
3 Q22§14, pp. 2175-8; SPN, pp. 313-6.
4 Q10II§15, p. 1253. The quoted translation is from Liguori (2015, p. 7); [cf. Further Selections
from the Prison Notebooks, 1995 {hereafter FSPN}, p. 167, esp. “the State is the instrument for
bringing civil society into line with the economic structure”- editorial note].
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the finance capital behind it, or New Deal policies as they preserve
the class character and exploitation of capitalism (p. 6). Hence,
State intervention in the economy does not mean the State’s
takeover of the economic base. The thrust of Gramsci’s argument,
according to Liguori, is that “it is certain that the state as such does
not produce but is the expression of the economic situation”.5
While Liguori admits that the theoretical importance of Gramsci
lies in his articulations of the superstructural elements, he stresses
that Gramsci’s arguments firmly rested on the Marxist assumption
of the determining role of the economic base. This emphasis by
Liguori urges us to pay particular (and further) attention to
Gramsci’s economic theory at large.
The second extension of the State regards the relationship
between political society and civil society. As I noted earlier,
Gramsci complained about the common view of the State in a
narrow sense as violence, as political society in his term. Rather,
modern States, in which democracy holds sway, exercise their
governance by obtaining people’s consent to its existing form. It is
important for the governing to make people believe that their needs
are somewhat reflected in the policies of the government. Such
consent is produced in civil society, via private institutions such as
the media and the church that influence people’s opinions and
views of the world in their daily life. Given this, Gramsci stressed
the importance of civil society for modern states: “[…] over its
historical development belongs to private forces, to civil society –
which is ‘State’ too, indeed is the State itself”.6 He thus redefined
the state in the very relationship between coercion deriving from
political society and consent from civil society.
Gramsci portrayed modern States characterized by the relationship between the two as the “integral State”. In comprehending
Gramsci’s arguments about the relationship, Liguori aptly focuses
on that term. As Liguori points out, Q6§10 reads “after the French
Revolution the bourgeoisie ‘could present itself as an integral
«State», with all the sufficient intellectual and moral forces needed
to organize a complete and perfect society’”.7 Also, in Q6§155, “In
politics the error occurs as a result of an inaccurate understanding
Q10II§41vi, p. 1310: Liguori (2015, p. 3); [FSPN, p. 427].
Q26§6, p. 2302; SPN, p. 261.
7 Q6§10, p. 691. The quoted translation is from Liguori (2015, p. 16); [cf. the slightly
different wording in SPN, p. 271 and in Gramsci 2007, p. 9].
5
6
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of what the State (in its integral meaning: dictatorship + hegemony)
really is?”.8 As seen in these parentheses, Gramsci called
contemporary States that unify coercion and consent (i.e., political
society and civil society) the “integral State”.
I agree with Liguori in stressing the importance of Gramsci’s extension of the concept of the State, which has been not fully explored. It was Buci-Glucksmann’s monumental work Gramsci and the
State of 1975 (translated into Italian in 1976 and into English in 1980)
that first provided a theoretical analysis of Gramsci’s idea of the
integral State.9 Her book is still influential in the Anglophone context. In my view, Liguori and Buci-Glucksmann have offered significantly different views of it in terms of the controversial issue of the
role of the economic base in Gramsci. This is related to what Liguori
calls the first extension that Gramsci’s extended State provided.
Before looking at their differences, let us begin by examining
what they agree on as the characteristics of the extended State. In a
word, they generally agree on what Liguori calls the second
extension (p. 8). They agree that Gramsci revised and updated the
concept of the State to account for the growing tendency of
governance relying on the people’s consent. In other words, they
agree that Gramsci’s extended State is based on his methodological
arrangement, as an ideal type, to divide political society, or the State
as violence, from civil society, the site of people’s consent. The
extended State thus appears as a remedy to the existing, yet
outdated and narrow, understanding of the State that exclusively
possesses coercive forces. In this sense, they also agree that
Gramsci anticipated the emergence of “regulated society” at the
end of the growing impact of consent on governance, when the
elements of coercion become obsolete and thus disappear.
What they might disagree can be found in their differing understandings of how Gramsci incorporated the role of the economy in
this revised view of the State. Crucially, their difference here centres
on their views about whether in Gramsci’s Marxism the superstructure is dependent on the economy or not. Liguori emphasizes
how the extended State embodied Gramsci’s Marxist conviction
that the economy is the ultimate foundation of the superstructure,
8 Q6§155, pp. 810-11. The quoted translation is from Liguori (2015, p. 17); [see SPN, p. 239
or Gramsci 2007, p. 117].
9 Buci-Glucksmann (1980).
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including both political and civil societies. According to him, the
extended State exhibits Gramsci’s view that the State is the expression of the economy, namely the State broadens its functions by
intervening the economy rather than maintaining laisser-faire,
especially after the Great Depression of 1929. To address this topic,
let us look at two arguments propounded by Liguori. First, he points
out that in the Notebooks there are cases where civil society signifies
economic society, apart from its major meaning as a site of private
institutions and thus of consent. A prime example of this is a
passage that I quoted earlier:
[b]etween the economic structure and the State with its legislation and
coercion stands civil society [...] the State is the instrument of the adequation of
civil society to the economic structure.10

Liguori’s quotation ends here, but an important argument could
be found right after this:
but the state has to “want” to do that, i.e., the representatives of the change
that has already come about in the economic structure have to be in control of
the State.11

Another example demonstrates how the State has to act in order
to prevent another depression in the “‘Keynesian’ phase” of the
capitalist economy. It does so by rationalizing production, by
guaranteeing savings, and by making up for industrial losses and
deficits (p. 5).12 Gramsci’s State here works to alter the contents of
civil society so that it fits with a new type of economy. It is thus
natural to interpret that Gramsci emphasized the relationship
between the economy and the State as being closer than that
between the superstructural elements, the State and civil society. By
this argument Liguori underpins his view that, within the Marxist
scheme Gramsci upheld, the State cooperates in the emergence of a
new economic structure, being neither dependent on the economic
conditions nor led under the consent produced in civil society.

10 Q10II§15:

1253. The quoted translation is from Liguori (2015, p. 7); [cf. FSPN, p. 167].
Q10II§15: 1253-4; [cf. FSPN, loc. cit.].
12 See Q9§8, p. 1101 [first draft or “A text”]: and Q22§14 [second draft or “C text”], p. 2176
[SPN, pp. 313-6, esp. p. 315].
11
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On the contrary, Buci-Glucksmann offers a view that Gramsci’s
extended State does not intervene in the economy as much as
Liguori assumes. It should be noted that she agrees with Liguori
about the elements of consent in the “extended” State. Yet, she
seems not to understand State intervention in the economy as a
major characteristic of Gramsci’s extended State, as Liguori does.
Chapters 3 and 14 of her book emphasize that Gramsci’s extended
State is a refined Leninist idea that prepares for the withering away
of the State by reinforcing the function of consent, namely, of
autonomous governance by the people themselves. In this sense,
she limits her discussion within the framework that Gramsci
developed in a famous argument: the extended State is established
by both coercion and consent, yet the elements of coercion
gradually disappear, as those of consent become predominant.13
Hence, Liguori and Buci-Glucksmann do not illustrate Gramsci’s
extended State in entirely the same way: Liguori’s focus on the
relationship between the State and the economy is missing in BuciGlucksmann’s version. It would be beneficial for readers if Liguori
could further clarify how his and Buci-Glucksmann’s understandings differ, and what would be the wider implication of focusing on
the connection between the State and the economy as a characteristic of the extended State, in particular in relation to the witheringaway thesis that Buci-Glucksmann emphasizes.
3. Common Sense
Common sense is another important and extensively discussed
idea of Gramsci’s. Chapter 6 of Pathways challenges a major understanding of it. This interpretation appreciates people’s common
sense as a reflection of truth against the established philosophy of
intellectuals, who claims to exclusively possess truth. In this view,
Gramsci’s common sense is understood in a positive way,
advocating the alteration of power relations underlying the existing
relationship between the philosophy of intellectuals and the
common sense of the masses.
Given this positive understanding of common sense, Liguori
begins by unpacking how Gramsci used the terms of “common
sense” and “good sense”, respectively. According to him, Gramsci’s
common sense falls into the following three meanings. First,
13

Q6§88, p. 763-4, SPN, pp. 262-3 [cf. Gramsci 2007, p. 75]; Buci-Glucksmann (1980, p. 282).
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Liguori emphasizes that Gramsci generally used the term common
sense in a negative way (pp. 90-3; p. 106; p. 111). Second, Gramsci
employed it in a descriptive way as a synonym of “culture” or “conception of the world” (p. 88). And third, Gramsci also referred to it
as a synonym for good sense in a neutral or positive way (p. 103; p.
109). Liguori then goes on to look at three meanings that Gramsci
gave to good sense. The first meaning is a synonym for the third
meaning of common sense (p. 103; p. 109). Second, it signifies “culture” or the “conception of the world”, as does the second meaning
of common sense (p. 110). The third meaning differentiates good
sense from common sense, denoting a better understanding of the
world than the common sense that confusingly entails the residues
of past philosophies and religions (p. 107).
Liguori’s summary is intriguing in that it underscores the
negative meaning of common sense, and that, at the same time, it
sheds light on good sense as a better understanding of the world
(pp. 108-9). It seems, however, that Liguori might not have fully
explained the relationship between common sense (which is
generally negative) and good sense (which is generally positive).
From my perspective, in Gramsci, it seems not contradictory to
look at the generally negative connotation of common sense, and
still observe possible elements of good sense in it. They could be
compatible. The point is, just as Aristotle did not abandon people’s
opinions as nonsense, but rather considered that they may contain
some truth, Gramsci also did not jettison common sense, but
regarded common sense as an unsorted view that includes a real
understanding of the world. Gramsci argued that good sense is the
people’s equivalent to philosophy as an ordered perception of the
world, while common sense itself cannot be so.
Philosophy is intellectual order, which neither religion nor common sense
can be. [...] Moreover common sense is a collective noun, like religion: there is
not just one common sense, for that too is a product of history and a part of the
historical process. Philosophy is criticism and the superseding of religion and
“common sense”. In this sense it coincides with “good” as opposed to “common” sense.14

Liguori quotes this passage (p. 104), but omits the important sentence that I have emphasized above where Gramsci contrasts good
14 Q11§12,

p. 1378; SPN, pp. 325-6, emphasis by TC.
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sense as people’s organized understanding of the world with common sense and religion as their disorganized perception.
Therefore, Gramsci argued that appreciating good sense as
“intellectual order” does not contradict comprehending common
sense itself in a negative way. It could be more helpful for readers if
Liguori discussed rather more closely how his general argument
that Gramsci’s common sense at large has a negative connotation is
consistent with his interpretation of Gramsci’s appreciation of good
sense. All in all, however, Liguori’s stress on the negative connotation of common sense works as a strong corrective to the existing
literature that has read it in a more positive way.
4. Further Methodological Inquiry Required?
Before concluding this short piece, I would like to provide a tiny
reflection on Liguori’s proposed method to “go back to Gramsci’s
texts”, which I agree with as a doubtlessly welcome trend. As
Gramsci’s Pathways exemplifies, this approach is a helpful way to
disentangle still-cryptic texts of the Prison Notebooks by revealing the
chronological and logical development of Gramsci’s thought
throughout his years of writing in prison. Observing the textual
development from the A texts to C texts, for instance, tells us how
he revised his original notes, and how he elaborated the ensemble
of his thought, which cannot be reduced a simple textual reading of
some keywords. In this sense, this approach helps us better reconstruct what Gramsci was thinking throughout his writing of the
entire Notebooks. Along with Gramsci’s Pathways, important recent
literature has more or less shared this approach, such as Le parole di
Gramsci, edited by Fabio Frosini and Liguori; and Il ritmo del pensiero,
by Giuseppe Cospito, to note only two.15
However, I think we are only halfway to the goal of “going back
to Gramsci’s texts”. Gramsci’s Pathways demonstrates how to do so,
yet it does not fully provide us with a proper and solid methodology that materializes this proposal. A philological approach itself,
mostly developed by Italian scholars, does not necessarily tell us
how ought we to read Gramsci. It is still possible to collect passages
from Gramsci to say what we are programmed to say. As this issue
of how to read thinkers’ texts has been one of the most discussed
problems in the history of ideas, we might be able to identify from
15 Frosini

and Liguori (2004); Cospito (2011) [in English Cospito 2016].
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such discussion of this problem in general some possible candidates
who could help us develop our reading of Gramsci. Here I would
like to limit myself to introducing ideas proposed by Leo Strauss
and Quentin Skinner, and how they would help us in further
promoting Liguori’s project of going back to Gramsci’s texts.
First, let me explore Strauss’s approach that focuses on “literary
character” of texts. Leo Strauss was a Jewish political philosopher
born in Germany, and is well known for his career as a professor at
the University of Chicago. In his Persecution and the Art of Writing, he
points out that great books have their own “literary character”,
depending on the difference in the way in which they may be read,
something that readers must understand before interpreting them.16
Looking at Gramsci’s Notebooks from this perspective, we can see
they have their own literary character, which is distinct, for
example, from Croce’s books, which he continued to revise
throughout his lifetime. We may be able to point out two literary
characters proper to Gramsci’s Notebooks. First, the Prison Notebooks,
as implied in Liguori’s approach, are left as a collection of his notes,
unedited after the author’s death, even though they have since
received different levels of editing. Second, stemming from the
first, they have a “private” character: Gramsci never considered
publishing them as they are.17 As they are written as Gramsci’s
private notebooks, they often lack the contexts that would enable
us to grasp in what sense Gramsci referred to his ideas. When we
write something publicly, we more or less try to translate what we
think into a publicly acceptable forms and languages, in order to
reach a wider audience. Through this process, written texts go
beyond the shared beliefs, languages, and customs of close friends
and colleagues. However, the Prison Notebooks are considerably
lacking in such a process of translation, due to his death and also to
the political situation in which, elucidating what he wrote in his
notebooks, would put his family in Russia under danger of
persecution.
Of course, the Notebooks have a surprising degree of logical
coherence in terms of their selected topics and his arguments,
despite the literary characters of being unedited and private.
16 Strauss

(1988), p. 30.
See, Gramsci’s project of writing an Anti-Croce based on his notes from Notebook 10
(Q10I§11, QdC p. 1234 [FSPN, pp. 354-6]; Q8, QdC p. 935 [PN Vol. 3, p. 231]).
17
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However, seeking logical coherence alone cannot be a satisfactory
criterion for reading them, as we can draw it convincingly from the
Notebooks in various ways, depending on how we are programmed
to read Gramsci – even by attributing to him views that he might
not hold. If my analysis of these two literary characteristics of the
Prison Notebooks is appropriate, then what would be a relevant way
to accommodate them in order to better interpret Gramsci’s Prison
Notebooks? My suggestion is a method proposed by Quentin
Skinner, a British intellectual historian, as Skinner’s approach limits
the possible ways in which they can be read, by rejecting logically
possible yet contextually impossible readings.
Let me examine here how Skinner’s approach is useful in reading
Gramsci. Skinner emphasizes the importance of seeking what the
thinker’s “intention in doing something” was,18 for they might have
failed to do what they originally intended to do. In the case of
Gramsci’s Notebooks, as I noted earlier, he did not intend to publish
them in the form we have them now. We tend to look into the
Notebooks retrospectively, more or less presupposing that his original intentions are included in his achievements. Yet, as Skinner
claims, we cannot derive Gramsci’s intentions from his
achievements. Let me look at an example from Gramsci’s first plan
of the Notebooks, expressed in a letter to Tat’jana Schucht, on 19
March 1927. Typically, his famous phrase to “do something für
ewig” in the Notebooks has often been interpreted as his
announcement of launching the project of establishing a
monumental achievement. Yet, the four topics he juxtaposed in the
letter are more down-to-earth. For instance, his interest in
linguistics – nothing “could be more ‘disinterested’ and ‘für ewig’
than that”19 – suggests that he intended to examine how the Italian
language took part in constructing the ruling class’s hegemony,
although he could not explore this topic thoroughly. By looking at
his plan in the letter as well as later plans in Notebooks 1 and 8, we
can discount the strong reading of the phrase für ewig as a plan to
seek something eternal or true.
On the contrary, by focusing on his intention to choose those
“interrelated” themes, we can see that he wished to pursue the topic
of Italian intellectuals – the topic he developed in his last pre-prison
18 Skinner

(1988), p. 65.
(1965), p. 58; Gramsci (1994a), pp. 83-4.

19 Gramsci
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article, Alcuni temi della quistione meridionale 20 – and that of the
masses, a part of which was discussed in the “Notes” as its main
topic about the Italian peasantry.21 As Liguori suggests (p. 23; p.
91), Gramsci’s proposed way of reading Marx could be applicable
to the research of Gramsci himself:
It is necessary, first of all, to reconstruct the process of intellectual
development of the thinker in question in order to identify those elements
which were to become stable and ‘permanent.’ [...] Research for the Leitmotif,
for the rhythm of thought as it develops, should be more important than that
for single causal affirmations and isolated aphorisms.22

To sum up, Strauss urges us to explore texts according to their
literary characters, which are those of being unedited and private in
the case of the Prison Notebooks. In dealing with these problems,
Skinner’s approach urges us to reconstruct the author’s motive in
writing them, by analyzing the discourse in which Gramsci was
situated and the terms and ideas which were available for him when
writing the Notebooks. I think these two ways would be also beneficial for Gramsci scholars if we try to “go back to Gramsci’s texts”
following Liguori. Gramsci’s Pathways provides English-language
readers with the prime example of this fruitful approach in Italian
scholarship. All in all, as along with other books from the Historical
Materialism series, this is a welcome addition to the new generation
of Gramsci literature.
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